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Questions of death... and life 
Defining death or life seems simple until
you try to define it precisely as people give
different opinions even within the same
culture. 4 One key issue is the value we
place on the capacity for self-awareness as 
a definitive criterion to whether we are alive
or not. Competing definitions of death may
at first appear purely ‘scientific’, but actually
have distinct underlying philosophical roots.
Philosopher Jonathan Glover explains 
this well: 
‘The only way of choosing [between competing
definitions of death] is to decide whether or not
we attach any value to the preservation of
someone irreversibly comatose. Do we value
“life” even if unconscious, or do we value life
only as a vehicle for consciousness?’ 5
Glover’s suggestion that the ‘permanently’
unconscious be classified as dead helps us 
to see that the brain death debate ‘is actually 
a debate about the moral status of human
beings. It is a debate over when humans
should be treated as full members of the
human community’. 6 The debate is, at least
in part, about differentiating between death
of the body and death of the person.
Are people souls who live in bodies
(substance dualism), a body-spirit amalgam
(hylomorphism), a body that actually
generates consciousness, or something else?
The answer will influence the definition 
of death.
The principal concept of personhood
dominating Western philosophy was
expressed by the physician John Locke
(1632-1704). 7 In his view, there is an
intrinsic binding relationship between a
person and their conscious personality. If
there is no possibility of any consciousness,
then although the body may still be alive,
that body can no longer be the same person
(or indeed any person) since their conscious
personality is no longer there. 8
The sixth century Roman philosopher
Boethius presented another view. For him 
a person was ‘an individual substance of a
rational nature’.9 You exist before you are
conscious. This resonates with passages in
the Bible that talk about God seeing us and
knowing us before we were born – indeed
even as we were being formed. Here God 
is treating us as individuals long before 
any conscious thought was possible. 10 In
contrast, the Lockean concept places little
value on bodily life per se, and all on
consciousness of self.
As distinct from determining: 
a) the criteria of death and 
b) the tests which establish that those
criteria have been met – both of which are
medical issues – defining death itself is
primarily a philosophical task (see Box 1).
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‘Death hath ten thousand
several doors for men to take
their exits’ but there can be little
argument about the importance
of making sure the door is
forever firmly shut behind
them, before declaring any
individual dead. 1 Only after
confirmation of his or her death
can a medical team consider
removing an individual’s vital
organs to use in transplant
procedures – the heart, kidneys,
liver etc. These organs need to
be in optimal condition to be
used for transplantation. In
order to deliver such viable
organs, the moment of death
has become defined as the time
when the brainstem ceases to
function, called ‘brain death’.
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It is especially important to be unequivocally
certain that those declared ‘brain dead’ are
dead. A primary reason for this is that the
‘dead donor’ rule stipulates that vital organs
intended for transplantation should only be
taken from donors who are actually dead.
However, even though brain death has been
used for well over thirty years now, there is
still a surprisingly large amount of general
public disquiet, alleged medical duplicity
and continuing academic dissent
surrounding the concept. 2
An ethical tension arises between the need
to provide an unequivocal diagnosis of death
and the possibility of saving another life or
lives through organ transplantation. Whilst 
it remains true that ‘greater love has no one
than this, that he lay down his life for his
friends,’ 3 it is essential to be sure that life has
expired, even when organs that may give life
to others are to be removed from the body.
Box 1: 
Four levels of defining death 11
LEVEL 1
Basic Concept of Death 
Philosophical (eg  ‘permanent cessation of
the integrated functioning of the organism as
a whole’, or ‘irreversible loss of personhood’.)
LEVEL 2 
General Physiological Standards
Medical and philosophical (eg  ‘irreversible
loss of spontaneous brain functions,’
‘irreversible loss of the ability to respond 
or communicate’.)
LEVEL 3 
Operational Criteria     
Medical, further specifying chosen criteria 
at level 2 (eg  ‘Inability to speak’ ,  ‘Inability
to blink’.)
LEVEL 4 
Specific Tests and Procedures 
Medical to establish chosen criteria at level 3
are fulfilled (eg  ‘Corneal reflex testing’.)
Defining death
Death is an event that marks the end of the
process of dying and the start of the process
of bodily disintegration. In 1982, a definition
of ‘the permanent cessation of functioning
of the organism as a whole’ was proposed. 12
Defining death as a biological event in this
way has the advantage of applicability to
both people and animals, but in an age of
intensive care, determining when it has
occurred is problematic. 13 Definitions of
death therefore balance two features:
society’s desire to include some form of self-
conscious capacity in the definition of what
it is to be alive and the ability to keep bodies
alive in intensive care long after any chance
of regaining conscious activity has passed.
Consequently definitions tend to focus on
brain activity. 
The US Uniform Determination of Death
Act therefore defines death as ‘irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain
including the brainstem’. 14 A more recent
definition of death is ‘the irreversible loss of
psychophysical integration, where psycho
refers to a capacity or potential for conscious
experience of the world.’ 15
Brain death then marks the beginning of 
a process that eventually ends in somatic
death, though somatic death does not occur
at that moment.
A brief history of brain death
It is interesting to see how the definition of
brain death evolved from the first clinical
description published in 1959. 16 In the
1960s, the arrival of ventilators to maintain
respiration in brain-injured patients,
combined with controversy over obtaining
organs for transplantation, created an urgent
need to reconsider the now ‘obsolete
criteria’ of death. 17
As recently as 1976, one transplant surgeon
stated: ‘I doubt if any of the members of our
transplantation team could accept a person
being dead as long as there is heartbeat…
Would any physician be willing to remove an
unpaired vital organ before circulation had
stopped?’ 18 Yet by 1968, a Harvard Medical
School committee, chaired by Henry
Knowles Beecher, had proposed a new
definition of brain death that would change
such attitudes forever.
Their report, ‘A Definition of Irreversible
Coma’, concluded that both ‘irreversible
coma’ and ‘permanent loss of intellect’ are
criteria for death. 19 Coma is an interesting
term when applied to a cadaver and it is
clear the authors considered ‘brain dead’
patients were:
‘biologically alive and deeply comatose… and
that their permanent unconsciousness justified
legally defining them as “dead”, especially for
the purposes of transplantation’. 
Beecher subsequently explained that he felt
it was arbitrary to puzzle over where to draw
the line in the process of death, and that the
motivation of saving lives by transplantation
was a good and sufficient reason for
drawing it at brain death. 20 In 1981, the 
US President’s Commission, by a majority,
accepted brain death as actual death. 21
In the UK, Royal Colleges had already
agreed by 1976, that brain death could be:
‘accepted as being sufficient to distinguish
between those patients who retain the
functional capacity to have a chance of even
partial recovery from those in whom no such
possibility exists’. 22
This definition was initially seen as a
prognosis, a prediction of what will happen.
But a memorandum added in 1979 shifted
the emphasis to a diagnosis, ie the patient
was considered to be already dead, since 
‘all functions of the brain have permanently
and irreversibly ceased’. 23
In 1995, however, the terminology was
changed from ‘brain death’ to ‘brainstem
death’, as residual activity in parts of the
brain other than the brainstem had been
demonstrated in ‘brain dead’ patients. 24 This
activity was considered irrelevant however
because it was held the individual could not
be ‘alive’ if the brainstem itself was not
functioning.
A series of highly influential articles in 
1982 led to virtually universal acceptance 
of brainstem death. 25 The central argument
given was that, just as the irreversible
cessation of heartbeat and respiration imply
the death of the whole patient without
implying the immediate death of every cell
in the body, so the irreversible cessation of
function of the brainstem does not
immediately imply the death of every brain




Though the vast majority of medical texts
accept that brain death (whether whole
brain, higher brain or brainstem) equals
death, critics maintain that while:
‘death is properly understood as a biological
phenomenon, “death” is a social construct
created for utilitarian purposes, primarily 
to permit organ transplantation’. 27
Such critics include Peter Singer:
‘The idea that someone is dead when their
brain is dead is, at best rather odd... Is the
distinction between life and death so basic that
what counts as dead for a human being also
counts as dead for a dog, a parrot, a prawn... 
or a cabbage?’ 28
The critics repeatedly raise a number of
clinical issues.
a) The formulation of brain death varies
from country to country with some such
as the UK focusing on brainstem death,
while others like the USA focussing on
whole brain death. This leads to different
countries using different criteria for
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Brain death marks the
beginning of a process that
eventually ends in somatic
death, though somatic death
does not occur at that
moment
If brain dead patients are
truly dead, why is there no
widespread use of such
‘cadavers’ for teaching
anatomy or training in
surgery?
brain death (eg EEG testing, which is
mandatory in France), and different
restrictions on the circumstances in
which it can be used to certify death 
(for example, Japan only permits use 
of brain death when organ removal for
transplantation is being considered).
Furthermore, the use of a variety of
secondary tests such as brain scans and
cerebral blood flow scans to determine
brain death leads to further uncertainty
about the tests sufficient to prove the
diagnosis, especially when secondary
tests are unreliable indicators of brain
death, when used on their own. 
b) If brain dead patients are truly dead,
why is there no widespread use of such
‘cadavers’ for teaching anatomy or
training in surgery? Such experience
would be much more realistic than using
corpses after circulatory-respiratory
death. These functioning circulation
cadavers would also be valuable in
testing drug toxicity and other
experimental treatments, where they
would offer distinct advantages over
animal models. If they are dead, why 
is this not considered appropriate? 29
c) Though the vast majority of brain 
dead cases require intensive hormonal
support and monitoring to preserve the
body’s physiological functioning, not all
do so. For example, diabetes insipidus
does not always occur, implying at least
part of the area of the brain responsible
for this element of homeostasis is intact. 30
Brain dead ‘cadavers’ also react to
incisions for organ removal with an
increase in heart rate and blood
pressure. 31 The use of muscle relaxants
and even general anaesthesia of donor
‘cadavers’ does not exactly square with
the assertion that all integrative function
of the body is lost in brainstem death.
d) Though every neurologist I have ever
asked has told me that all their patients
who have been diagnosed as brainstem
dead have died within weeks at most
(an interesting contradiction in terms in
itself), there still remain cases of patients
declared brain dead who are maintained
on ITU support for months or even
years. 32 Though brain death in
pregnancy is uncommon, when it does
occur the mother can be kept alive for
months to deliver the baby; there are
dozens of reported instances of this. 33
Theological reflections 
on brainstem death
There are hundreds of references to death in
the Bible. Death is seen as both physical and
spiritual but arguably the nearest Scripture
comes to a definition of somatic death is ‘the
dust returns to the ground it came from, and
the spirit returns to God who gave it’. 34
It is important to realise that this verse, 
and the biblical concept of the spiritual soul
outliving our physical body, does not help us
in defining the moment of death. However,
such attempts are often made by Christian
doctors; one argued that ‘the destruction 
of the brain is the moment when the soul
leaves the body, and the organs of a soulless
body are there for the taking’. 35 However,
this is more of a dualist view of the soul as a
ghost in a machine rather than a biblical one
Box 2:
Diagnosis of brainstem death 26
Exclusions
a. Where the patient may be under the effects of drugs. 
b. Where the core temperature of the body is below 35°c (eg exposure).
c. Where the patient is suffering from severe metabolic or endocrine disturbances 
which may lead to reversible coma (eg diabetes).
Preconditions of diagnosis
1. The patient must be deeply comatose.
2. The patient must be maintained on a ventilator.
3. The cause of the coma must be known.
Personnel
a. The brainstem death tests must be performed by two medical practitioners.
b. The doctors involved should be experts in this field and should not be connected 
in any way to the transplantation team treating any organ recipient(s).
c. At least one of the doctors should be of consultant status. Junior doctors 
are not permitted to perform these tests.
d. Each doctor should perform the tests twice.
Tests
The diagnosis of brainstem death is established by testing the function of the cranial nerves
that pass through the brainstem. If there is no response to these tests the brainstem is
considered to be irreversibly dead.
1. The pupils are fixed and do not respond to changes in the intensity of light.
2. There is no corneal reflex.
3. The vestibulo-ocular reflexes are absent, (ie no eye movement occurs after the
instillation of cold water into the outer ears).
4. No motor responses within the cranial nerve distribution can be elicited by painful or
other sensory stimuli, (ie the patient does not grimace in response to a painful stimulus
applied to the face or to the limbs).
5. There is no gag reflex to bronchial stimulation by a suction catheter passed down 
the trachea.
6. No respiratory movements occur when the patient is disconnected from the ventilator
for long enough to ensure that the carbon dioxide concentration in the blood rises above
the threshold for stimulating respiration, (ie after giving the patient 100% oxygen for 
five minutes the ventilator is disconnected for up to ten minutes. If no spontaneous
breathing of any sort occurs within those ten minutes, the brain stem is incapable 
of reacting to the presence of the carbon dioxide and is thus dead).
Once two doctors have performed these tests twice with negative results the patient 
is pronounced dead and a death certificate can be issued.
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of humans being ‘living souls’. 36 In an
increasingly utilitarian world, such a dualist
view leaves brain-damaged individuals
vulnerable. If being brainless equates to
being soulless why not take their organs
sooner rather than later and why not use, 
or even genetically engineer, anencephalic
foetuses as a source of organs?  
The Bible does assure us that ‘when we die
and leave this earthly body, we will have 
a house in heaven’; 37 that our new bodies
after death will differ from, and not be
dependent upon, the state of those we leave
behind. 38 This does not mean, however, that
we can be indifferent about the diagnosis of
death; as Peter Singer correctly points out,
when ‘warm, breathing, pulsating human
beings are declared to be dead...their organs
can be cut out of their bodies and given to
strangers’. 39
In our quest to optimise availability 
of organs for transplantation and not to 
waste valuable resources on indefinitely
ventilating corpses, we should not forget 
the undeniable reality that currently ‘the
condition of the terminally comatose patient
is masked by more than technology: it is
masked by a diagnosis which regards the
dying as already dead’. 40 There is ongoing
need for more debate and empirical research
on the reliability of and outcomes following
a diagnosis of brainstem death.
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